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Introduction
The funder/provider split in the area of social services is now a long-established reality in
Aotearoa/New Zealand. It has been the subject of much debate and criticism see, for
example, Boston et at 1996. However, it remains the principal means by which a range of
NGO service providers gains access to State funding. At the same time, with the advent of a
new Labour-Alliance coalition government in 1999, the possibility arises that one of the
social policy reforms the government might consider would be to amend or even to abolish
the funder/provider system.
The following paper outlines the background to a small research project on the issue of
funder/provider to be carried out in the Hamilton area in 2001. In it we provide the
analytical basis to the project and a description of our proposed methodology. Our
objective is to discover the perspectives on funder/provider from a number of Maorl and
Non-Maori NGOs, with the intention of being able to make a productive contribution to the
debate on this system.
Funder/Provider
Since the 1980s non-governmental organisations such as charities, religious bodies, iwi
and Urban Maorl Authorities have come to play an Increasing role in the provision of social
services in fields such as public health and social welfare.
Shaw 1999:197 summarlses this situation when he points out that a lot of the work once
performed by the old Department of Social Welfare has been contracted out to
`organisations such as Bernardos, the Open Home Foundation, and a plethora of iwi-based
social service agencies". To his list of examples should be added the non-iwi based Urban
Maori Authorities.
The funder/provider split has been the mechanism by which both State and non-State
service bodies compete for contracts for services. It seeks to maintain a division between
the central State as a funding body and also as a policy-maker and those agencies, both
State and non-State, which provide services. The funder/provider split originated in this
country In the wave of New Right-inspired restructuring of the economy, of the public
sector and of society as a whole Matheson 1997; Scott 1997 which Labour began in the
1980's and which National and the National-led coalition of 1996-1999 subsequently
intensified.
The funder/provider split was meant to achieve a number of objectives consistent with New
Right ideoloi. Separating funding from provision was meant to lessen the chances of the
State-as-funder being `captured' by interest groups that seek to divert funds to their own
agendas Bertram 1988. It was also intended to facilitate a greater participation of non-
State bodies In the provision of services, thus facilitating a shift from an allegedly
unhealthy one of State monopoly or near-monopoly to a more market, competitive model.
By so doing it would also reduce the role of the State as provider, arid the New Right sawreducing the role of the State as a desirable end in itself. Finally, it was also a mechanismfor achieving cost controls Shaw 1999, or even cost-cutting by the State.
The means by which non-State providers were to gain access to State funding was bycompeting for contracts. For example, in the wake of the 1993 health sector reforms the
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health system became reliant "on a network of contracts from ministers, through RHAs, to
an array of public, private and voluntary providers..." Boston et al 1996:174. The
contractual form that was to bind providers to the funder was also a reflection of New Right
ideas of governance. The intention was to "replicate the arms-length relationship between
buyers and sellers in competitive markets and to thereby mitigate `provider-capture'..."
Schick 1996:74. The predominant form of contract would be short-term, that is for twelve
months, and it would "specify, among other things, the quantity, quality and timeliness of
service delivery" Shaw 1999:191.
The Funder/Provider Split Assessed
The funder/provider split was a major assault on New Zealand's Fabian tradition of social
service delivery. That is, the seivices were administratively centralised In Wellington and
delivered by government departments that claimed legitimacy as monopoly or near-
monopoly providers on the basis of their possession of expert knowledge via their
employment of professionals in the relevant fields. The funder/provider split generated
opposition from social democratic thinkers and unions opposed to privatisation for whom,
"government by contract" was one more means by which government could privatise its
functions Freedland 1994.
On the other hand the funder/provider split was consistent with some of the critiques of
the state funder provider model which had been made from radical perspectives Bertram
1988. That is, like the New Right, certain elements from the political Left had criticised the
Welfare State for being too bureaucratic, too monolithic, too unresponsive to the needs of
Maori, women and Pacific Island people. With reference to Maorl, for instance, Boston et al
1996:146 report that In the 1980's there was "considerable disenchantment" in the Maci-I
community with the Department of Maori Affairs' ability to represent Maorl interests and to
deliver services effectively. Women made their voice known In the report of the 1988 Royal
Commission on Social Policy 1988:Vol 11 with critiques of their marginalisation in policy
making, and by policy makers, in such areas as health and housing. In their contribution
to that report, Pacific Island people were deeply condemnatory of what they saw as
"institutionalised racism" within the State and the society It constructed 1988 Vol IV.
The Royal Commission on Social Policy summarised those views when it acknowledged
that, with reference to the provision of social services, "state provision has often been rigid
and standardised, making insufficient recognition of individual, local and cultural variation
in requirements" 1988:Vol 11:791. Labour Party members and union representatives
involved in the debates on privatisatlon and the future of the State had also come to realise
that change was both necessary and overdue. The welfare state was characterised as
having been "marked by paternalism, bureaucracy and centralisation" Maharey 1989:166
and it was acknowledged that one of the positive side-effects of privatisation had been that
the "old, white, male-dominated state structures have been dispersed, The paternalist
approach to social welfare has been badly eroded" HarrIs 1989:222.
But as practised by a series of New Right regimes, the funder/provider split cUd not deliver
what the critics of the old regime had in mind. For example, well-meaning supporters of
the `nonnalisation' and `deinstitutionalisation' of the handicapped and the psychologically
ill for example, Blaszczyk 1988 were soon to see that the New Right version of `community
care' meant dumping people onto the streets, or into a marae, without adequate support
services.
The contractual model did not eliminate bureaucacy, it simply changed it's role and shifted
some of its requirements onto the providers.
A number of analyses have been made of the problems that the system has generated for
providers See Shaw 1999; Te Puni Kokiri 2000a, b, c, d, e. These can be briefly
summarised as follows: a take it or leave it attitude by State funders to the content of
contracts; the transaction costs of applying for and monitoring short-term contract; the
lack of certainty about funding; and the focus of the contracts on the provision of a narrow
and inflexible set of quantitative outputs. Some Maori providers also claim that State
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funders do not treat Maori providers as partners in terms of their supposed commitment to
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Te Puni Kokirl 2000a.
Despite these criticisms, Te Puni Kokiri still argues that: "Contracting continues to be a
relevant and effective process for engaging communities and other groups in a wide range
of social, cultural and developmental Issues" Te Puni Kokiri 2000a: 11. The system has
permitted and encouraged the growth of iwi, Maori, and Pacific Island providers, for
example, who are responsive to particular spiritual and cultural needs in their client
community, and not only their physical or material needs.
Possible Options for Change
Our research is therefore focussed on trying to discover whether providers wish to see the
present system scrapped or simply improved upon. In considering this question, three
major options appear to present themselves:
1 A return to a State near monopoly.
The State would once again become both the major funder and provider of services. All the
problems of the funder/provider split would therefore be overcome. The current
government has shown, through its ACC policy, that there are areas of social service
provision that it considers are best delivered via a State body. Whether the majority of
existing providers would want a return to a State monopoly, and whether it would be
politically and economically feasible to reconstruct one, are amongst the problems with this
option.
2 Radical devolution. ofprovision, Ministry control offundtng.
This is the scenario recently proposed by Merepeka Ruakawa-Tait cited in Masters 2000,
A5 who put forward the argument that the Child, Youth and Family Services Department
be abolished and the services it carries out transferred to community agencies. This would
carry the devolution of provision, and its privatisatlon, to its logical extreme. At the same
time, the sub-contracting role of bodies like CYFS would disappear and the service
providers would contract directly with the relevant policy ministry. One objective of this
change might be to replace the `take it or leave it' contracting process with one based on
genuine negotiations.
But there are other, far reaching, implications in this proposal. For example, CYFS social
workers, as defined by the 1971 Social Welfare Act, and the police, have the statutory
monopoly on removing at risk children from their homes. The abolition of CYFS would also
necessitate the redefinition of social worker, the possible redundancy of the existing CYPS
social workers, and the relocation of the statutory obligations and powers granted to those
workers under existing legislation.
However, there is no likelihood of this scenario eventuating under the present Government
as Prime Minister Clark has firmly rejected it. Instead, she has pledged to rebuild CYFS in
order to deliver" a professional child welfare service" Cited in Masters 2000. We might
expect a similar rejection should the proposal be suggested for other areas of social service
provision.
3 A new partnership modeL
It has been proposed that a new form of partnership be developed between funders and
providers. There are variations on what this might mean. Robinson 1999, for instance,
suggests that "community-based paradigms" might be developed which could Involve
government, business and community agencies. The intention would be to "form a new
type of organisation in which all members contribute and participate" with the intention of
creating "an effective mechanism with the ability to break free of rigid sectoral boundaries"
and which would move from "government imposed" contracts to a "negotiated partnership
arrangement" 23.
There are problems with this scenario. First, how do we define community groups? Many of
the largest NGO providers such as Barnardos and the Salvation Army are national
organisations, not based on specific localities. They might have branches or offices in
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different cities and towns, but that is not the same as being local organisatlons. Flow do
they fit into the community scenario, should we be able to overcome the second problem
which is one of defining what precisely is meant by a community? If a community is a
close-knit area with some kind of collective awareness, then we would suggest that this
nation has lots of neighbourhoods and suburbs, but few communities. If it is used in the
wider sense, as in `gay community', then it loses its resonance as a focus for location based
partnerships.
We also doubt that many private sector firms would be willing to participate in such
partnerships. The majority of large firms are members of the Business Roundtable and
unlikely starters in such a project. Finally, the question of how and to what extent monies
are transferred by the State to non-State providers would still remain to be resolved. If It is
not to be on a contractual basis then what will be the basis?
4 Art tmprouecl contractual modeL
Reconsidering what critics have outlined as being the principal faults of the existing
system, there are a number of ways in which it might potentially be improved. For
instance:
a Good faith contracting.
Through the Employment Relations Act, the government has introduced the concept of
good faith bargaining into the contractual relationship between employers and unions,
Good faith Is a principle that can apply to a range of contractual relations. In the case of
Germany, for Instance, Reffner reminds us that:
"According to the German Supreme Court,. .every long-lasting contractual contractual
relationship today is especially governed by the principle of bona fide {Authors' note:
Good faith In English} which requires both parties to respect the purpose of the other
side and to refrain from all actions that may harm the contractant and even not to seek
the maximum profit when there is a visible dependence on the other party" 1993:185.
A first start, then, might be to institute good faith bargaining as a prerequisite in contract
formation, and with the same requirements as now apply in industrial law. Namely, that
genuine bargaining takes part and that both parties are committed to resolving differences
between them if possible.
b Longer term contracting.
The above reference uses the phrase `long-lasting'. Contractual arrangements do not have
to be long term to be long-lasting, an annual contract rolled over for several years becomes
a long-lasting relationship, for example. However, to help resolve some of the problems that
derive from short-term contracts, moving to longer-term contracts, of two or three years
say, should be seen as an option. The intention would be to build a closer relationship
between the funder and the provider and to facilitate the provider's ability to carry out
planning and strategic decision-making.
c More flexibility in the contracts.
Moving away from specilying narrowly defined outputs in the contracts, perhaps to more
broadly defined `outcomes' would be part of this change. It is recognised that there would
still have to be purchasing criteria which were such that the State met its responsibility to
manage the taxpayer's money efficiently, operational in terms of cost controlment by the
State. Flexibility should also involve a readiness by funders to work with providers to
remedy deficits and to provide resources to help overcome areas of weakness.
What is being advocated in the reformed funder/provider model is a move away from arms-
length contracting to a more hands-on, relational, model of contracting, such as the one
that has been said to apply to Japanese firms and their sub-contractors Saiko, 1992. This
model is also about building trust between the parties Lorenz, 1993 and can thus be seen
as a. variant on the partnership option. As boston et at. 1996, p180 have noted, the
contracting process between funders and providers can be seen as a relational one
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involving "trust and long-term mutual benefit" not only to the contracting partners but also
to their clients or customers.
A reformed funder/provider system would have the potential to help the nation create a
flexible and responsive system of service delivery as part of our development as a diverse
and pluralistic society. Relying neither on a State monopoly of funding and providing, nor
on a New Right model of contractualism, it could deliver a "Third Way" of service funding
and provision that was specific to our society.
Brief Outline of the Research Project
Our small research project is meant as a contribution to the above debate on how best to
fund and provide social services. We want to seek the views on these issues of a number of
non-State providers in the Hamilton area. Because of our limited financial resources, we
will focus on no more than a dozen providers. We have identified six Maori and six non
Maorl including one Pacific Islander based providers that are willing to participate in the
research project. They were selected following informal discussion with persons active In
the social services field. Our project has been given ethical approval by the Waikato
University's Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Ethics Committee.
We are currently at the stage of preparing a questionnaire to be used In interviews with our
participants. This will be refined in consultation with representatives of provider
organisations. The final version of it will be sent to the providers in advance of the
interview. Following the writing up of the interviews, arrangements will be made, if needed,
for re-interviewing on specific items, We will divide the interviewing process between us
according to factors such as availability and appropriateness.
We cannot predict what results we will obtain, but a number of possible areas of interest
might arise. Firstly, it might be that there is a particularly Hamilton, or provincial-city
provider, perspective. There might be differences between. as well as similarities among,
the Maorl and the non-Maori providers. Whether or not non-iwi based Maori providers see
the Treaty of Waitangi as source of concern Is another matter that could prove of interest.
Or, it might be that the research throws up issues and questions that prove to be totally
unexpected. Hopefully, too, the project will point the way to further areas of research that
can be carried out in the Waikato area, or at a national level. We shall see.
Conclusion
If there is one thing on which there is a consensus in the area of funding and providing
social services, it is that the existing system is riddled with faults and difficulties. Some
people would jettison the existing funder/provider system, others would seek to replace it
by a partnership model, and others would wish to reform it. It is our intention to make use
of a small-scale research project to seek the views of non-State providers located in this
area. We are very enthusiastic about this small project, if only because we are aware of the
commitment and effort that those providers put into their work and are keen to discover
what their views are.
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